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12 March 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Brazil: (The US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro describes the current attitude of the Goulart government toward the Brazilian left as contradictory and equivocal.)

(In reviewing the Brazilian political scene, the embassy noted that Goulart and his followers have recently made a number of concessions to the left in the labor field, including appointments of pro-Communists to influential posts in the labor movement.)

(On the other hand, Goulart has provoked leftist criticism by several anti-inflation moves in recent weeks. His government has also apparently caused the postponement of a Communist-sponsored Congress for Solidarity with Cuba, scheduled for this month.)

(The embassy indicates that recent statements by Goulart have been intentionally equivocal. On 21 February, for example, he told the US ambassador that he intends to follow a moderate domestic and foreign policy, but for political reasons must appear to be making concessions to the left. On 6 March, however, in an answer to Communist-influenced port workers, he indicated that he is against the "enemies of the people," but must at times make concessions to them for tactical reasons.)

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Iraq: Deputy Prime Minister Sadi's call on 10 March for a joint military and political command for the "liberated" Arab states is an attempt to head off, by an expression of Arab solidarity, public pressures in Iraq and Syria for union of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq.

Sadi's mention of the "liberated" states by name --UAR, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen--is an attempt to relegate the UAR to the position of an equal partner in the movement for Arab unity. Sadi's proposal has little military potential.

If such a joint command should develop, Nasir is likely to welcome it, at least publicly, in the hope of ultimately dominating this or any other institution created to promote unity of these "liberated" countries. He probably also will see it as a useful device for adding to the pressure on the Jordanian and Saudi governments. [REDACTED]


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DAILY BRIEF

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LAOS



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Communist China - Laos: (Although Peiping has promised to withdraw its road-building teams from Laos following completion in April of a highway from the Chinese border into Phong Saly, scattered low-level reports indicate that Chinese may already be at work on a more extensive road project farther south which would require more time to complete.)

(The withdrawal was announced in a joint communiqué issued on 10 March at the conclusion of a visit to China by the Laotian King. The promise to pull out was probably prompted by recent publicity concerning Chinese Communist intervention in Laos.)

(The Laotians had requested Chinese help in constructing an extension of the Phong Saly road to the southwest. There has been no word about Peiping's response but several reports indicate that the Chinese have started work on some portions of this route which apparently runs to Ban Houei Sai via Muong Sing, Nam Tha and the Chinese Communist town of Mengla.)

(Map)

[REDACTED]

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

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